John Allan Granger
2820 Audubon Village Drive, Suite 339
Audubon, Pennsylvania 19403
(610) 287-2109

Constitutions:
Constitution for the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Constitution for the United States of America

Court Cases:
Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 (1896)
Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 (1956)
Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989)
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat 264)
Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)
Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 (1951)
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)
Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U.S. 1 (1936)
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch 137) (1803)
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970)
Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253 (1856)
Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984)
United States v. Heffner 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1970)
United States v. Smith, 106 F.3d 350 (11th Cir. 1996)

Statutes:
42 Pa.C.S 742 (Appeals from Common Pleas)
42 Pa.C.S. 2522 (Attorney Oath of Office)

Rules of Court:
Montgomery County local rule 212(k)(4)
Montgomery County local rule 1012(b)
Montgomery County local rule 1301 et. seq.
Pa. R.A.P. 301 (Requisites for an Appealable Order)
Pa. R.C.P. 205 (Notice to Attorney General. Constitutionality of Statute)

Other Sources:
2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 4th Ed 1873 at 540-541.
Annotated Constitution of the United States This document was Prepared by the
Congressional Research Service Library of Congress for the UnitedStates Senate. Johnny H. Killian and George A. Costello are Co-Editors
Judicial Canons
Jury Rights Day Proclamation by Pennsylvania Governor Robert P. Casey September 5, 1994
Magna Carta, or Great Charter of our Liberties, June 15, 1215
Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d)
Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(f)

I. Statement of Jurisdiction

Jurisdiction over this direct appeal from a final order of a Court of Common Pleas of in a contract dispute is conferred on the Superior Court of Pennsylvania by 42 Pa.C.S 742 (Appeals from Common Pleas) and Pa.R.A.P. 301 (Requisites for an Appealable Order)

II. Order in Question

FINAL ORDER

AND NOW, this 15th day of October, 1998, the case having been called for trial, the Motion of the Plaintiff as Defendant on the Counterclaim for Dismissal of Defendant's Counterclaim is GRANTED. Defendant was advised that any appeal to the Superior Court must be perfected within thirty (30) days.

BY THE COURT

ALBERT R. SUBERS, J.

III. Statement of the Questions Involved

A.Should the material fact, the lack of a "Motion for Dismissal" on record, in contradiction to the lower court's order, vacate the order?

B.Did the lower court take subject matter jurisdiction of both the Complaint and the Counterclaim by compelling appellant under both the Complaint and the Counterclaim to arbitration pursuant to the locally promulgated rules of court?

C.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by ruling that the lower court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a breach of a contract?

D.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the jury in a 'trial by jury' to hear the counterclaim?

E.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by seizing the right to review the application of law from the jury in a 'trial by jury' before they were selected, sworn and seated?

F.Does the law apply equally to everyone?

G.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by arbitrarily altering the terms of the contract?

H.Did the lower court have jurisdiction when the lower court arbitrarily denied appellant's right to enforce appellant's contract?

I.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by failing to act on appellant's motion of record before acting on appellee's ex parte motion?

J.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by restricting appellant's enforcement of appellant's contract for professional services with respect to Sworn, Sacred and Solemn Attorney Oath of Office, 42 Pa.C.S. 2522, the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys and other aural, oral and written agreements?

K.Can appellant Constitutionally be without a remedy for a breach of contract?

L.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by making decisions without motions, witnesses, evidence or testimony on the part of anyone of record?

M.Since both the Complaint and Counterclaim were for breach of contract for professional services, did the lower court abuse its discretion by determining a lack of competent subject matter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim when the lower court determined competent subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint?

N.Was appellant prejudiced by the lower court when the court stenographer willfully did not make a complete record of the trial?

O.Should the lower court and/or other informed court personnel havetaken or initiated appropriate disciplinary measures for conduct unbecoming an Officer's of the Court?

P.What is vague?

Q.Was the value of the tape defined?

R.Is appellant allowed to proceed with unspecified damages?IV. Statement of the Case

This is an appeal form a Final Order entered against appellant based upon a Complaint brought by the appellee invoking the law side of the lower courts jurisdiction. Appellant filed an answer and counterclaim. The complaint and counterclaim were heard by a Board of Arbitrators. The Board of Arbitrators found for appellee and against appellant. Appellee discontinued before trial. At the trial before the 'trial by jury' jury was selected, seated or sworn the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS ruled that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim for a breach of contract.

Appellant brings this appeal because appellant was denied jurisdiction for a breach of contract on appellant's counterclaim thereby causing additional damage to appellant. Most of the contracts are in writing on the letterhead of appellee undersigned by Linderman.

The inability to sue for a breach is against the intent and purpose of a contract.

A. Procedural History

On October 18, 1996 in a letter (R. 4a) appellee entered into a contract with appellant for "professional services".

On October 31, 1996 appellee wrote a letter confirming an oral agreement/contract with the Pennsylvania State Police (R. 30a) for the return of appellants three (3) tapes.

On November 12, 1996 appellant verbally informed appellee of appellee's breach of appellee's contract with appellant forprofessional services.

On November 15, 1996 (R. 9a) appellant in writing informed appellee of appellee's breach of appellee's contract with appellant for professional services.

On November 25, 1996 (R. 10a) appellant again in writing informed appellee of appellee's breach of appellee's contract with appellant for professional services.

On November 27, 1996 appellee wrote a letter to appellant confirming the oral agreement/contract with the Pennsylvania State Police (R. 18a) for the return of appellants three (3) tapes was not upheld.

On February 7, 1997 (R. 12a) appellant in writing informed appellee of appellee's breach of appellee's contract with appellant for professional services.

On April 2, 1997 appellee filed a Complaint (R. 1a-4a) invoking the law side of the lower courts jurisdiction.

On April 4, 1997 appellee used the MONTGOMERY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE to effect service of appellee's action against appellant at appellant's business location.

On April 22, 1997 appellant filed an answer and counterclaim (R. 5a-19a) for a breach of contract by appellee

On April 29, 1997 appellee filed an answer to appellant's counterclaim against appellee

On August 6, 1997 appellee moved for a 212(k)(4) conference.

On August 25, 1997 appellee moved at a 212(k)(4) conferenceto force appellant into compulsory arbitration. The HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ordered appellant to compulsory arbitration because appellant refused to place a value on the case and stated that "Only a jury in a 'trial by jury' can determine the value of the case."

On April 2, 1998 David M. MacFarlan, Chairman, David P. Brown III and Andrew L. Miller bar certified attorneys, members of the MONTGOMERY COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION, arbitrators for the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA freely, willfully knowing and expecting that they would be paid $100 for their services signed a Constitutional (Pennsylvania and United States) Oath of Office (R. 20a). The arbitrators found (R. 20a) for Plaintiff, appellee, on the complaint and against Defendant, appellant, on appellant's counterclaim.

On April 30, 1998 appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from Award of Board of Arbitrators (R. 21a).

On August 18, 1998 appellant filed a Mandatory Judicial Notice (R. 22a-34a).

On August 21, 1998 at a pre-trial conference the HONORABLE LAWRENCE A. BROWN of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA indicated that the HONORABLE LAWRENCE A. BROWN would schedule the case for trial.

On August 28, 1998 appellee without the knowledge of appellant or communication with appellant filed a Praecipe to Settle, Discontinue and End (R. 35a).

On September 10, 1998 appellant filed a Motion to Proceed with Counterclaim (R. 36).

On September 15, 1998 appellant filed a Motion for More Clear and Definite Statement (R. 37).

On September 17, 1998 the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA through Sharon M. Birek scheduled a hearing on the Counterclaim before the HONORABLE LAWRENCE A. BROWN.

On September 30, 1998 the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA through Sharon M. Birek revised the notice that the scheduled hearing will be on appellant's Motion to Proceed with Counterclaim before the HONORABLE WILLIAM W. VOGEL.

On October 2, 1998 appellee without the knowledge of appellant or communication with appellant filed a Praecipe to Discontinue (R. 38) appellee's already discontinued complaint.

On October 5, 1998 the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA through Sharon M. Birek revised the courtroom.

On October 7, 1998 the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA through Sharon M. Birek revised the notice that the scheduled hearing had been changed to a trial.

On October 15, 1998:

1.The HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. called appellant's counterclaim for trial. The HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. made the decision (Tr. 2) that the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA had no jurisdiction.

2.At trial ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY threw appellant's Holy Bible into the air from appellant's table in the Courtroom (R. 40a).

3.At trial the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA called for a jury for a 'trial by jury'(Tr. 3; R. 49a).

4.At trial the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA dismissed appellant's counterclaim for breach of contract (Order appealed).

5.At trial the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA ordered ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY to file a written entry of appearance (R. 39a) before ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY left the building.

On October 23, 1998:

1.Appellant filed an Affidavit (R. 40a-41a).

2.Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (R. 42a-49a).

On October 26, 1998 the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. of the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA refused (R. 50a) appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.

On October 27, 1998 appellant notified MIKE FISHER, PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL, of a possible Constitutional challenge in appellant's Motion for Reconsideration.

On November 13, 1998 appellant filed a Notice of Appeal andRequest for Transcript (R. 51a).

On November 17, 1998 the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS, JR. ordered appellant to file a Concise Statement of the matters complained of.

On November 30, 1998 appellant filed a Concise Statement of the matters complained of.

On January 4, 1999 appellant sent a letter to the court reporter requesting changes in the transcript.

On January 6, 1999 appellant sent the Civil Docketing Statement which was filed on January 8, 1999.

On January 7, 1999 the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS dated his Opinion.

On January 8, 1999 in a letter the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS ordered appellant not to contact the court reporter requesting changes in the transcript and instead file a petition.

On January 29, 1999 appellant filed a Petition to Correct Transcript.

B.Statement of Facts

There was a contract; aural, oral and written between appellee and appellant (Tr. 23; R. 1a-4a; R. 5a-19a).

There was a written contract by appellee for appellant with the State Police (Tr. 9; Tr. 13; Tr. 16; Tr .19; Tr. 24; R. 18a), not objected to by appellee.

There was an oral contract by appellee with appellant (R. 44) where appellee would sue the CHESTER COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY if the CHESTER COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY did not uphold the plea agreement, not objected to by appellee.

There was an oral contract by appellee with appellant to be able to approve any changes in the plea agreement (Tr. 10), not objected to by appellee.

Before the complaint was filed appellant notified appellee of a breach of contract orally on November 12, 1996, not objected to by appellee.

Before the complaint was filed appellant notified appellee of a breach of contract in writing (R. 9; R. 10; R. 12), not objected to by appellee.

Appellee did not inform appellant of appellant's appeal rights (Tr. 17; Tr. 21) a requirement for effective assistance of counsel, not objected to by appellee.

Appellant requested a 'trial by jury' (Tr. 3; R. 37), not objected to by appellee.

The value of the tape was defined (Tr. 8; Tr. 23), not objected to by appellee.

C. Judges whose determinations are to be reviewed

HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS

HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER

V. Summary of the Argument

An ex parte Motion to Dismiss deprived appellant of appellant's opportunity to object and was prejudicial to appellant. The jury in a 'trial by jury' has the right both to decide issues of fact and to review the application of law. The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS has unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as provided by law. No law preventing a breach of contract claim was cited. The law is designed to apply equally to everyone. The promulgated rules of court are law. The lower court cannot arbitrarily alter the terms of a contract. The lower court's denial of jurisdiction arbitrarily denied appellant of appellant's right to enforce appellant's contract and thereby appellant's right to due process of law.

If appellant, as a contractor, has no legal recourse in the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, the court of original jurisdiction, for a violation of the contract for professional services against the contractee, appellee, the rescinding of Pa. R.C.P. 205 on October 12, 1976, effective October 27, 1976 is unconstitutional on its face.

Appellant cannot Constitutionally be without a remedy for a breach of contract.

VI. Argument for Appellant

A.Should the material fact, the lack of a "Motion for Dismissal" on record, in contradiction to the lower court's order, vacate the order? (The opinion acknowledges the motion was not of record. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Within the four corners of the HONORABLE ALBERT R.SUBERS "OPINION" the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS wrote "Prior to trial, on October 15, 1998, O'Donnell, Weiss & Mattei brought an oral motion to dismiss the defendant's counterclaim."

This alleged motion does not appear anywhere of record and must have been an ex parte motion. This ex parte deprived appellant of appellant's opportunity to object, was prejudicial to appellant and violated appellant's due process rights.

A double standard most surely exists when an attorney and the judiciary attempt to hold themselves to be above the law.

"The public have almost as deep an interest in the independence of the bar as of the bench."

Cammer v. United States, 350 U.S. 399 at 407 (1956)

Judicial Canon 3(A)(4) states "A judge should accord to every person who is legally interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according to law, and ... must not consider ex parte communications concerning a pending proceeding."

Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(d) states "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice."

Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(f) states "It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: knowingly assist a judge or judicial officer in conduct that is a violation of applicable rules of judicial conduct"

B.Did the lower court take subject matter jurisdiction of both the Complaint and the Counterclaim by compelling appellant under both the Complaint and the Counterclaim to arbitration pursuant to the locally promulgated rules of court? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Throughout the case no jurisdictional questions had yet arisen or that would have even begun to challenge jurisdiction. Thereby confirming that the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA had jurisdiction in the instant case.

Appellant was required to pay $300 to the arbitrators to appeal the arbitrator's decision (R. 21a).

With these facts we now review the law.

"The COURT OF COMMON PLEAS has unlimited original jurisdiction in all cases except as may otherwise be provided by law."

Constitution for the Pennsylvania Commonwealth, Article V Section 5(b)

The language of Chief Justice Marshall is most apposite. "It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not; but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of the Constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given,than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be treason to the Constitution. Questions may occur which we would gladly avoid; but we cannot avoid them. All we can do is to exercise our best judgment, and conscientiously perform our duty."

Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat 264) at 404

Writing for the majority, Chief Justice John Marshall rhetorically dennunciated the concept of sovereign immunity in America in these words: "... what is there, in the exalted station of the officer, which shall bar a citizen from asserting, in a court of justice, his legal rights, or shall forbid a court to listen to the claim... If one of the heads of departments commits any illegal act, under colour of his office, by which an individual sustains an injury, it cannot be pretended that his office alone exempts him from being sued in the ordinary mode of proceeding, and being compelled to obey the judgment of the law. How, then, can his office exempt him from this particular mode of deciding on the legality of his conduct, if the case be such a case as would, were any other individual the party complained of, authorize the process?"

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch 137) (1803) at 170

"The very essence or civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties of government is to afford that protection." Id. at 163. Therefore, in the light of the important and unresolved constitutional question inherent in this matter, one does not have to be a rocket scientist to realize that this pro se appellant has been attemptedly disenfranchised of the rights and privileges of American citizenship accorded to appellee.

C.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by ruling that the lower court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a breach of a contract? (Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Appellant's right to contract is absolute.

Article I Section 10 plainly states "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility."

"It is a principle of human nature-and every man is conscious of it, I apprehend-that, if he does an act which he is conscious is wrong, his conduct will be along a certain line. He will pursue a certain course not in harmony with the conduct of a man who is conscious that he has done an act which is innocent, right, and proper. The truth is-and it is an old scriptural adage-'that the wicked flee when no man pursueth, but the righteous are as bold as a lion.' Men who are conscious of right have nothing to fear. They do not hesitate to confront a jury of their country, because that jury will protect them; It will shield them, and the more light there is let in upon their case the better it is for them.

Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499 at 509 (1896)

The HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS (Tr. 27) acknowledged that if counsel for appellee did not file a written entry of appearance, appellant's counterclaim would not have been dismissed. Ergo, the lower court did have subject matter jurisdiction over a breach of a contract.

The HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS abused the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS discretion when the HONORABLE ALBERT R.SUBERS ruled that the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a breach of a contract for professional services.

D.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the jury in a 'trial by jury' to hear the counterclaim? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

If jurors were supposed to judge "only the facts", their job could be done by computer. It is precisely because people have feelings, opinions, wisdom, experience, and consequences that we depend upon jurors, not machines, to judge court cases.

"In practice, this means that juries have rights both to decide issues of fact and to review the application of law. Justice Vaughan's decision permanently established these jury rights as English and American legal doctrine." (R. 34)

Jury Rights Day Proclamation by Pennsylvania Governor Robert P. Casey September 5, 1994

This case where William Penn was found innocent of preaching an unlawful religion formed the basis of jury rights, religious freedom, personal freedom and law in Pennsylvania and America.

We must have standards and authorities in all the affairs of life. If we do not, then we have much confusion. America has a government with certain powers granted to it by the people. Teachers exercise authority in the school. Parents exercise authority in the home. Citizens exercise authority as jurists in thecourtroom as well as at the ballot box.

This is a profound principle some Americans have forgotten. The day Americans accept the principle that rights descend from government authority is the day they lose their freedoms. It's as simple as that.

This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written word of God.

Article I Section 6 of the Constitution for the Pennsylvania Commonwealth states "Trial by jury shall be as heretofore and the right thereof remain inviolate."

The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America states "No person shall be ... without due process of law ..."

The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution for the United States of America states "In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved ..."

The original complaint was filed as a "CIVIL ACTION -LAW" (R. 1a-2a) separating the instant case from equity and making the instant case a 'common law action'.

Cases ''at Common Law''.--The coverage of the Amendment is ''limited to rights and remedies peculiarly legal in their nature, and such as it was proper to assert in courts of law and by the appropriate modes and proceedings of courts of law.'

[Footnote 26] Shields v. Thomas, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 253, 262 (1856).

This document was Prepared by the Congressional ResearchService Library of Congress for the United States Senate. Johnny H. Killian and George A. Costello are Co-Editors http://caselaw.findlaw.com/data/Constitution/amendment 07/02.html#F26

"This right [to trial by jury] was designed 'to guard against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of rulers,' and 'was from very early times insisted on by our ancestors in the parent country, as the great bulwark of their civil and political liberties.' 2 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, 4th Ed 1873 at 540-541. See also Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 151-154 (1968) (tracing the history of trial by jury)."

E.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by seizing the right to review the application of law from the jury in a 'trial by jury' before they were selected, sworn and seated? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

The principle of a Common Law Jury or Trial by the Country was first established on June 15, 1215 at Runnymede, England when King John signed the Magna Carta, or Great Charter of our Liberties. It created the basis for our Constitutional, system of Justice.

"We accept the fair-cross-section requirement as fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and are convinced that the requirement has solid foundation. The purpose of a jury is to guard against the exercise of arbitrary power - to make available the commonsense judgment of the community asa hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor and in preference to the professional or perhaps over-conditioned or biased response of a judge. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S., at 155-156."

Taylor v. Lousiana, 419 U.S. 522 at 530 (1975)

"Arbitrary power and the rule of the Constitution cannot both exist. They are antagonistic and incompatible forces; and one or the other must of necessity perish whenever they are brought into conflict. To borrow the words of Mr. Justice Day, 'there is no place in our constitutional system for the exercise of arbitrary power.' Garfield v. U.S. ex rel. Goldsby, 211 U.S. 249, 262, 29 S.Ct. 62, 66."

Jones v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 298 U.S. 1 at 24 (1936)

In a Constitutional system of justice, such as ours, there is a judicial body with more power than Congress, the President, or even the Supreme Court. Yes, the trial jury protected under our Constitution has more power than all these government officials. This is because it has the final veto power over all "acts of the legislature" that may come to be called "laws". In our system of checks and balances, the jury is our final check, the people's last safeguard against unjust law and tyranny.

The jury in a 'trial by jury' has the right and obligation to determine the facts and the application of law. No judicial and/or administrative authority exists which could deprive appellant of appellant's right to due process of law.

F.Does the law apply equally to everyone? (Not addressedby opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

The HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS did not hold ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY, a bar certified attorney, to the locally promulgated rules of court when ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY appeared at trial without filing a written entry of appearance as required before entering into the case as required by Montcomgery County local rule 1012(b) (Tr. 26-27; R. 46a).

The HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER in contrast did hold appellant, a non-learned non-attorney, not held to the same standards as an attorney, at the Montcomgery County local rule 212(k)(4) hearing to the locally promulgated rules of court by compelling appellant to arbitration when appellant stated that the arbitrators, Montcomgery County Bar Association members, might be prejudiced for fellow Montcomgery County Bar Association members and when appellant stated that only a jury in a trial by jury was able to determine a monetary amount for damages. The HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER repeatedly tried to move appellant off of appellant's point but was unsuccessful.

"... held to less stringent standards than ... lawyers"

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972)

The promulgated rules of court are located in Pennsylvania Title 42 and as such are law. Local rules are required to be promulgated and as such are law.

If there is no need to use or follow the rules of court, there is no need for the rules of court to exist.

G.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by arbitrarilyaltering the terms of the contract? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

The right to contract is absolute. Absence fraud or illegal activity the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA did not have the ability to modify the terms of a contract for professional services.

This was a contract entered into fully by appellee with respect to the Rules of Professional Conduct, Attorney Oath of Office, 42 Pa.C.S. 2522, and any other considerations that might arise during the contract. The bar holds itself out to the public as a learned, knowledgeable, experienced and ethical profession.

Appellee voluntarily, intelligently, knowingly, willfully knew or should have known when appellee failed to honor appellee's contract with appellant for professional services.

This is much more than a simple breach of contract case. Appellant was acting under the sincere firm belief and conviction that Linderman was a learned, knowledgeable, experienced and ethical professional who was acting solely in appellant's highest and best interest. Appellant had been repeatedly assured by Linderman that Linderman worked exclusively for appellant and appellant had the right to approve and authorize any and all changes to agreements/contracts.

Aural Oral and written agreements between Linderman and appellant and aural, oral and written agreements between Linderman and ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY LORI A. ADAMS et al. and the Pennsylvania State Police et al. which were made by and on behalf of appellant were understoodas gospel (Tr. 9-10; R. 44a). Linderman, a criminal defense attorney, coerced appellant to plead guilty to a crime, Summary Disorderly Conduct, by repeatedly assuring appellant that after appellant plead guilty Linderman would force the agreements to be upheld by ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY LORI A. ADAMS et al. and the Pennsylvania State Police et al. Instead after Linderman coerced appellant to plead guilty to a crime, Linderman's profanity in court and refusal to represent appellant as contracted for was repugnant and abhorrent to appellant.

Appellant had a reasonable expectation to believe that appellee would not violate appellee's contract with appellant.

...we should question the integrity of any criminaldefense attorney who would violate the ethical norms of the profession..."

Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491U.S. 617 at 649 (1989)

"... a defendant who admits factual guilt (even coerced) need not silently accept any punishment that the government (or attorneys) chooses to mete out, ... Otherwise, the constitutional rights to effective assistance of counsel and due process are illusory."

United States v. Smith, 106 F.3d 350 at 351, 352 (11th Cir. 1996), Judge Barkett

" 'Of all the rights that an accused person has, the right to be represented by counsel is by far the most pervasive for it affects his ability to assert any other rights he may have.' " United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 at 654, 104 S. Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)(quoting Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1956))

'The special value of the right to the assistance of counsel explains why "[i]t has long been recognized that the right to counsel is the right to the effective assistance of counsel." Id. 654

"While a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed prisoners to gladiators." Id. at 657

There was no 'regardless of what we do, we can't be sued clause' within the four corners of the letter initiating the formal contract after the oral agreement.

Lindermans actions are prima facia evidence that Linderman was actually working against appellant's rights. Appellant had a contract with appellee that appellee would fight for appellant's rights if ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY LORI A. ADAMS et al. and the Pennsylvania State Police et al. attempted to violate the contract. This is clearly a breach of contract with appellant and undermines the entire concept of an independent criminal defense ability for any citizen.

"the authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client"

Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2 code comparison

H.Did the lower court have jurisdiction when the lower court arbitrarily denied appellant's right to enforce appellant's contract? (The opinion stated appellants counterclaim was dismissed because appellant failed toplead damages recoverable at law as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Appellee's complaint for a breach of contract for professional services had jurisdiction. Appellant's counterclaim for a breach of the same contract for professional services had jurisdiction as well.

Any other option was prejudicial to appellant and represented abuse of the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority.

I.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by failing to act on appellant's motion of record before acting on appellee's ex parte motion? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Appellant did not get a hearing or receive due process of law relative to appellant's Motion for More Clear and Definite Statement.

Appellee's ex parte motion was acted on (Tr. 26; R. 37a; R. 42a) and deprived appellant of appellant's opportunity to object and was prejudicial to appellant.

J.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by restricting appellant's enforcement of appellant's contract for professional services with respect to Sworn, Sacred and Solemn Attorney Oath of Office, 42 Pa.C.S. 2522, the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys and other aural, oral and written agreements? (The opinion stated appellants counterclaim was dismissed because appellant failed to plead damages recoverable at law as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Suggested answer inthe affirmative.)

"It [The oath] leaves no room for a change of heart. It calls for more than a profession of present loyalty or promise of future attachment."

Garner v. Los Angeles Board, 341 U.S. 716 at 729 (1951)

Linderman is a bar certified attorney and an Officer of the Court and as such is an unpaid agent of the government.

"An agency of the government must scrupulously observe rules, regulations, or procedures which it has established. When it fails to do so, it's action cannot stand and courts will strike it down."

United States v. Heffner 420 F.2d 809 at 809 (4th Cir. 1970)

If appellant, as a contractor, has no legal recourse in the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, the court of original jurisdiction, for a violation of the contract for professional services against the contractee, appellee, the rescinding of Pa. R.C.P. 205 on October 12, 1976, effective October 27, 1976 is unconstitutional on its face.

K.Can appellant Constitutionally be without a remedy for a breach of contract? (The opinion stated appellants counterclaim was dismissed because appellant failed to plead damages recoverable at law as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Suggested answer in the negative.)

No! Article I Section 10 plainly states "No State shall ... pass any ... Law impairing the Obligation ofContracts, or grant any Title of Nobility."

"It will be an evil day for American liberty if the theory of a government outside of the supreme law of the land finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. No higher duty rests upon this court than to exert its full authority to prevent all violation of the principles of the Constitution."

Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)

The Declaration of Independence and the Constitutions for the Pennsylvania Commonwealth and the United States of America make it clear that basic human rights are inalienable. Ergo, no human authority, no King, no president, no government, no corporation, no criminal, no individual whatsoever can abrogate or abridge inalienable rights.

L.Did the lower court abuse its discretion by making decisions without motions, witnesses, evidence or testimony on the part of anyone of record? (The opinion acknowledges the motion was not of record. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

The material fact is that the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS made decisions on an ex parte Motion to Dismiss by appellee.

M.Since both the Complaint and Counterclaim were for breach of contract for professional services, did the lower court abuse its discretion by determining a lack of competent subject matter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim when the lower court determined competent subject matter jurisdiction over the Complaint? (The opinion stated appellants counterclaim was dismissedbecause appellant failed to plead damages recoverable at law as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

The lower court abused its discretion and acted in a discriminatory manner towards appellant.

N.Was appellant prejudiced by the lower court when the court stenographer willfully did not make a complete record of the trial? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

During the October 15, 1998 trial Jennifer Kane, the court stenographer, on Jennifer Kane's own accord turned off Jennifer Kane's tape recording device and took Jennifer Kane's hands off of Jennifer Kane's stenographic machine.

Ergo Jennifer Kane, the court stenographer, did not make a complete record of the trial held on October 15, 1998. This material fact was included in appellant's Motion for Reconsideration (R. 44a), appellant's Request for Transcript (R. 51a) and appellant's Petition to Correct Transcript (R. 52a).

This material fact was absent from the Transcript.

O.Should the lower court and/or other informed court personnel have taken or initiated appropriate disciplinary measures for conduct unbecoming an Officer's of the Court? (Not addressed by opinion. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Appellant's Holy Bible was physically assaulted during the trial by ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY (R. 40a).

Judicial Canon 3(A)(3) states "A judge should be patient, dignified, and courteous to litigants ... and should require similar conduct of lawyers ..."

P.What is vague? (The opinion stated the term 'procedural irregularities' is too vague. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Within the four corners of the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS "OPINION" the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS wrote "The term 'procedural irregularities' is too vague..."

Appellant found this wording on the Pennsylvania Unified Court System form for Writ of Certiorari from a District Justice (Form AOPC 313-98).

Q.Was the value of the tape defined? (The opinion stated the defendant was asked to place a value on the tape and was unable to do so. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Within the four corners of the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS "OPINION" the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS wrote "At the hearing before the undersigned on October 15, 1998, the defendant was asked to place a value on the tape and was unable to do so."

On the contrary, the transcript clearly shows on page 23 line 19 a value of "two million dollars". The transcript clearly shows on page 8 line 22 a value of "to million dollars".

While the tape was originally purchased for only a nominal economic value, the tape now has substantial value, as possible evidence of a crime by a lawenforcement agent, as evidenced by the refusal to return the tape as agreed. This represents a taking without due process. Appellant and appellee had a contract (Tr. 9-10; R. 43a-44a) as to how Linderman was to act in this situation. Linderman's action of allowing the refusal to return the tape as agreed to damaged appellant. The refusal to return the tape as agreed to by the Pennsylvania State Police et al. justifies any valuation.

The two million dollar figure was only offered after the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS required appellant to place a value on the seized cassette tape that was agreed to be returned by the ATTORNEY LORI A. ADAMS et al. and the Pennsylvania State Police et al. as a part of an enducement to get appellant to plead guilty to any crime.

The change in position of the ATTORNEY LORI A. ADAMS et al. and the Pennsylvania State Police et al. from a Felony 3 to a Summary Disorderly Conduct ($25 + costs) charge plus a 'chat' and Lindermans failure to uphold appellants plea agreement are prima facia evidence of the value of the tape and a possible false arrest proceeding.

At the 212(k)(4) hearing appellant stated that only a jury in a ‘trial by jury’ was able to determine a monetary amount for damages. The HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER repeatedly tried to move appellant off of appellants point but was unsuccessful.

Appellant clearly shows at page 7 line 25 of the transcript that "only a jury in a 'trial by jury' was able to determine a monetary amount."

R.Is appellant allowed to proceed with unspecified damages? (The opinion stated appellants counterclaim was dismissed because appellant failed to plead damages recoverable at law as a result of the alleged breach of contract. Suggested answer in the affirmative.)

Yes

VII. Conclusion and Relief Sought

As a matter of law the lower court's Final Order entered on October 15, 1998 should be vacated and the case should be remanded to that Court with directions for retrial in a ‘trial by jury’.

Respectfully submitted,

Dated: February ___, 1999 ___________________ __________

John Allan Granger, Appellant

VIII. Opinion Below

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing "BRIEF AND REPRODUCED RECORD OF APPELLANT" upon the persons and in the manner indicated below which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121:

Service by first class mail addressed as follows:
David A Megay, Esq. 610-323-2800
O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.
41 High Street
Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464-0285
(Counsel for O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.)

and which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121 and 521:

Service by certified mail addressed as follows:
Mike Fisher, Pennsylvania Attorney General (717) 787-3391
16th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

and which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121 and 522:

Service by certified mail addressed as follows:
Nancy M. Sobolevitch, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania (215) 560-6300
Court Administrator of Pennsylvania
1515 Market Street, Suite 1414
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Respectfully Submitted

February ____, 1999 ________________________

John Allan Granger

The contents of appellant's reproduced record is as follows:

(1) "(R.1a)" 4 pages, Docket Entry 040497, Complaint by appellee. Appellant directs attention to the 'Notice to Defend and Claim Rights' and the cover of the Complaint where the appellee states the complaint is a 'Civil Action - Law' and appellee's Exhibit "A" a letter that is a confirmation of an oral agreement and represents the basis of the contract between the appellee and appellant.

(2) "(R.5a)" 14 pages, Docket Entry 042297, Answer and Counterclaim by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the entire contents of appellant's counterclaim.

(3) "(R.19a)" 1 page, Docket Entry - not allowed by local rule (served upon appellee), Praecipe for Civil Trial by Jury by appellant. Appellant directs attention to 'A trial by jury is demanded as a matter of right and to guaranty that no persons that have the responsibility of deciding the law and the facts in this case might be biased because of their ties with the legal profession and law enforcement' and appellant's request for a 'trial by jury'.

(4) "(R.20a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 040398, Award of Board of Arbitrators. Appellant directs attention to the sworn solemn Oaths by the arbitrators.

(5) "(R.21a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 043098, Notice of Appeal from Award of Board of Arbitrators by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the fact that appellant was required to pay $300 to the arbitrators.

(6) "(R.22a)" 13 pages, Docket Entry 081898, Mandatory Judicial Notice by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the entire contents to show judicial notice was given to the lower court.

(7) "(R.35a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 082898, Praecipe to Settle, Discontinue and End by appellee. Appellant directs attention to the facts that appellee discontinued appellee's complaint and attempted to discontinue appellant's counterclaim.

(8) "(R.36a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 091098, Motion to Proceed with Counterclaim by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the requirement of the lower court for appellant to file a motion to proceed with appellant's counterclaim which had been discontinued without consultation or agreement withappellant.

(9) "(R.37a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 091598, Motion for More Clear and Definite Statement by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the failure of the lower court to give appellant due process of law.

(10) "(R.38a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 100298, Praecipe to Discontinue Action by appellee. Appellant directs attention to the facts that appellee had already filed a Praecipe to Settle, Discontinue and End.

(11) "(R.39a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 101598, Praecipe for Appearance by appellee. Appellant directs attention to the fact that appellee's Praecipe was hand written and only filed after the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS directed appellee's counsel to do so at the trial to follow the local rule even though the local rule requires "No attorney shall represent the interest of a party to any civil action in the Court ... unless or until he files a written entry of appearance" thereby allowing appellee to violate a local rule of court and prejudicing appellant.

(12) "(R.40a)" 2 pages, Docket Entry 102398, Affidavit by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the entire contents to show appellee's counsel's failure to file a written entry of appearance before the trial and appellee's counsel's physical assault on appellant's Holy Bible during the trial.

(13) "(R.42a)" 8 pages, Docket Entry 102398, Motion for Reconsideration by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the entire contents to show appellant gave the lower court the opportunity to reconsider the lower court's actions before an appeal was required.

(14) "(R.50a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 102698, Refusal of Motion for Reconsideration by the lower court. Appellant directs attention to the script writing by the court to show that appellant's motion was not granted or denied, but refused.

(15) "(R.51a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 111398, Request for Transcript (in Notice of Appeal) by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the entire contents to show appellant gave the lower court notice of the inability of the stenographer to produce a 'true and correct' copy of the transcript of the lower court trial.

(16) "(R.52a)" 1 page, Docket Entry 012999, Petition to Correct Transcript Request for Transcript by appellant. Appellant directs attention to the entire contents to show appellant gave the lower court notice to correct errors in the transcript of the lower court trial.

Dated: February ___, 1999 ___________________________

John Allan Granger

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing Designation of Contents of Reproduced Record upon the persons and in the manner indicated below which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121:

Service by first class mail addressed as follows:
David A Megay, Esq. 610-323-2800
O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.
41 High Street
Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464-0285
(Counsel for O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.)

Respectfully Submitted

February ____, 1999 ___________________ _____

John Allan Granger
2820 Audubon Village Drive
Suite 339
Audubon, Pennsylvania 19403
(610) 287-2109

I, John Allan Granger, hereby certify that on February 16, 1999 John Allan Granger served a computer regenerated copy of John Allan Granger's NOTICE TO PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 235 where in item ten of John Allan Granger's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION the Constitutionality of Pa. R.C.P. 205 is challenged in light of actions of the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS upon Mike Fisher, Pennsylvania Attorney General, 16th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 by certified mail #Z-496-636-938 on October 31, 1998 by first class mail to:

O'DONNEL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.

Date: _______________ ___________________________

John Allan Granger

February 22, 1999

Mike Fisher, Pennsylvania Attorney General (717) 787-3391
16th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Dear Mr. Fisher,

Attached please find a copy of a brief and reproduced record pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 521 where the Constitutionality of Pa. R.C.P. 205 is challenged in light of actions of the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS.

Very truly yours,

John Allan Granger

February 22, 1999

Nancy M. Sobolevitch, Court Administrator of Pennsylvania (215) 560-6300
Court Administrator of Pennsylvania
1515 Market Street, Suite 1414
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102

Dear Ms. Sobolevitch,

Attached please find a copy of a brief and reproduced record pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 522 where the Constitutionality of Pa. R.C.P. 205 is challenged in light of actions of the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS.

Very truly yours,

John Allan Granger

February 16, 1999

O'DONNEL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.
41 High Street
Pottstown, Pennsylvania

Dear Mr. Megay,

Attached please find a computer regenerated copy of a letter sent to the PENNSYLVANIA ATTORNEY GENERAL pursuant to Pa. R.C.P. 235 where in item ten of John Allan Granger's MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION the Constitutionality of Pa. R.C.P. 205 is challenged in light of actions of the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS upon Mike Fisher, Pennsylvania Attorney General, 16th Floor, Strawberry Square, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120 by certified mail #Z-496-636-938 on October 31, 1998.

Very truly yours,

John Allan Granger

March 4, 1999

MS. KIMBERLY A. SHAFFER, Special Investogator, Litigation Section
Office of Mike Fisher, Pennsylvania Attorney General (717) 787-3391
16th Floor, Strawberry Square
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania 17120

Dear MS. KIMBERLY A. SHAFFER, Special Investigator,

Unfortunately John Allan Granger stated that if the actions of the HONORABLE ALBERT A. SUBERS with respect to Pa. R.C.P. 205 are upheld, the above stated actions might be unconstitutional.

The HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS actions have not yet been upheld.

If the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure are not an "Act of the Assembly", are the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure indeed actually law?

Very truly yours and awaiting your written response, I am,

John Allan Granger

John Allan Granger, non-learned non-attorney, requests that corrections to the transcript be made pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1926 in the above captioned case and requests the following changes to wit:

Page 5, line 14 should be "42 Pa.C.S. 2522"

Page 6, line 5 should be "lucre"

Page 7, line 10 should be "oral and written"

Page 8, line 22 should be "value at two million"

Page 17, line 13 should be "showing" not "selling"

Page 24, line 12 should be "that was 'never' proven"

There is no indication where the transcribing was stopped and started at the trial. "We ARE on the record!" is not on the record.

Respectfully Submitted

_________________, 1999 ________________________

John Allan Granger

I, John Allan Granger, hereby certify that John Allan Granger served a true and correct copy of John Allan Granger's PETITION TO CORRECT TRANSCRIPT by first class mail to:

HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS

O'DONNEL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.

__________________, 1998 By: _______________________

John Allan Granger

Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 3517, you must complete and return this form and attachments to the Prothonotary of the superior court by the due date indicated on the enclosed Superior Court docket. A completed copy of this form must also be provided to each appellee.

THIS FORM IS FOR CIVIL APPEALS ONLY. FAMILY AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS APPEALS MUST BE COMPLETED ON THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS DOCKETING STATEMENT. CRIMINAL APPEALS MUST BE COMPLETED ON THE CRIMINAL DOCKETING STATEMENT. If this not a civil appeal, notify the Superior Court Prothonotary and the correct form will be provided to you.

A. CASE INFORMATION

1. Case Caption: O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.
(Appellee / Plaintiff / Defendant)
vs.
John Allan Granger
(Appellant / Defendant / Counter Claimant)

2. Superior Court Docket #3686-98

3. Party or parties filing appeal: John Allan Granger

B. TIMELINESS OF APPEAL (Check only those which apply)

X Date of Judgment of order appealed from: October 15, 1998

X Date of Rule 236 notice: October 16, 1998

X Date Judgment filed: October 16, 1998

X Date reconsideration filed: October 23, 1998

X Date reconsideration Refused: October 26, 1998

X Date notice of appeal filed: November 13, 1998

C. APPEAL FROM THE TRIAL COURT

Attach copies of the following: (1) trial court's judgment, order or decree from which this appeal is taken, (2) notice of appeal, (3) trial court docket, and (4) trial court opinion, if available.

1. Is the order appealed from a final order? X Yes No

Specify Rule and subsection governing finality Pa.R.A.P. 341

3. How have the issues been preserved?

The issues have been preserved by: answer, counterclaim, exhibits, praecipe, memorandum of law for arbitration, appeal from a board of arbitrators, mandatory judicial notice, pre-trial motions, timely objections, transcript, affidavits and post-trial motions.

D.NATURE OF DISPOSITION BELOW

F. Dismissal for lack of jurisdiction

E.TYPE OF CASE

D. Contract Dispute

F. RELATED CASES

none

G. DESCRIPTION OF APPEAL

1. Brief description of actions and response below:

Procedural irregularities in a breach of contract dispute action resulting in damages to appellant.

2. Issues to be raised on appeal

Appellant will raise the issues of:

A.Should the lack of a "Motion for Dismissal" on record, in contradiction to the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS October 15, 1998 order, vacate the order?

B.Did the HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA a court of original and competent jurisdiction take subject matter jurisdiction of both the Complaint and the Counterclaim for the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA by compelling John Allan Granger under both the Complaint and the Counterclaim to arbitration pursuant to the locally promulgated rules of court on August 27, 1997?

C.Did the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS exceed the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS judicial and/or administrative authority when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS ruled that the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA did not have subject matter jurisdiction over a breach of a contract for professional services?

D.Did the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS have a responsibility to allow the jury in a 'trial by jury' to hear the counterclaim?

E.Did the lower court exceed the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS seized the right to review the application of law from the jury in a 'trial by jury' before they were selected, sworn and seated?

F.Did the lower court act in a fair and impartial manner when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS did not hold ATTORNEY DAVID A. MEGAY, a bar certified attorney, to the locally promulgated rules of court when in contrast with the HONORABLE PAUL W.TRESSLER holding John Allan Granger, non-learned non-attorney, to the locally promulgated rules of court?

G.Did the lower court exceed the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS arbitrarily altered the terms of the contract?

H.Did the lower court have jurisdiction when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS arbitrarily denied John Allan Granger's right to enforce John Allan Granger's contract?

I.Did the lower court exceed the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority when John Allan Granger did not get a hearing or receive due process of law relative to John Allan Granger's Motion for More Clear and Definite Statement that needed to be heard before proceeding with the October 15, 1998 trial?

J.Did the lower court exceed the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS restricted John Allan Granger's enforcement of John Allan Granger's contract for professional services with respect to Sworn, Sacred and Solemn Attorney Oath of Office, 42 Pa.C.S. 2522, the Rules of Professional Conduct for Attorneys and other aural, oral and written agreements?

K.Can John Allan Granger Constitutionally be without a remedy for a breach of contract?

L.Did the lower court exceed the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS made decisions without motions, witnesses, evidence or testimony on the part of anyone?

M.Since both the Complaint and Counterclaim were for breach of contract for professional services, did the lower court exceed the lower court's judicial and/or administrative authority when the HONORABLE ALBERT R. SUBERS determined a lack of competent subject matter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim for the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA in contradiction with the HONORABLE PAUL W. TRESSLER determining competent subject matter jurisdiction over the Counterclaim for the COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA?

N.Was John Allan Granger prejudiced by the lower court when Jennifer Kane, the court stenographer, did not make a complete record of the trial held on October 15, 1998?

O.Should the lower court and/or other informed courtpersonnel have taken or initiated appropriate disciplinary measures for conduct unbecoming Officer's of the Court?

HAVE YOU ATTACHED: Order from which appeal is taken? X Yes No

Notice of appeal? X Yes No

Trial court docket? X Yes No

Trial court opinion? Yes X No (none done)

IF THIS DOCKETING STATEMENT IS NOT FILLED OUT IN ITS ENTIRETY WITH ALL REQUESTED DOCUMENTS ATTACHED, YOU MAY BE PRECLUDED FROM PARTICIPATING AT ORAL ARGUMENT AND MAY FACE THE IMPOSITION OF WHATEVER FURTHER SANCTIONS THE COURT DEEMS APPROPRIATE, INCLUDING DISMISSAL OF THE APPEAL.

__________________________________ Date: ___________________

John Allan Granger

Attachments: Exhibit "A" trial court's order from which this appeal is taken, "B" notice of appeal, "C" trial court docketIN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

I hereby certify that I am this day serving the foregoing "Civil Docketing Statement" upon the persons and in the manner indicated below which service satisfies the requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 121:

Service by first class mail addressed as follows:
David A Megay, Esq. 610-323-2800
O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.
41 High Street
Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464-0285
(Counsel for O'DONNELL, WEISS & MATTEI, P.C.)

Respectfully Submitted

January ____, 1999 ________________________

John Allan Granger
2820 Audubon Village Drive
Suite 339
Audubon, Pennsylvania 19403
610-287-2109

John Allan Granger, non-learned non-attorney, pursuant to the order dated November 15, 1998 in the above captioned case makes the following statement to wit:

This appeal was taken in the above captioned case to cause a review of the procedural irregularities in this case.

Respectfully Submitted

November ____, 1998 ________________________

John Allan Granger